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WvotING LAW JOURNAL

JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE MANN ACT
Congress in 1910 enacted the "White Slave Traffic Act," most often
The primary purpose of the legislation, as a
termed the "Mann Act.'
reading of the statute demonstrates, is to prevent commercialized vice in
interstate commerce and to minimize the movement of females for immoral purposes. Even in the light of this legislative intention, however,
the courts have refused to hold that pecuniary gain is an essential element
of the crime, and the profit motive is not a sine qua non to the application
of the Act.2 The words "debauchery" and "for any other immoral purpose," employed in the statute, give a wide sweep to the Act to embrace
such acts as polygamy, 3 and concubinage. 4 Convictions have been had in
cases where women were transported to manage houses of prostitution, 5
7
take part in nude dances, G and entice men to enter houses of prostitution.
The gist of the offense hinges around interstate transportation and in
order to come within the statute, the transportation must be of a woman
or girl and for one or more of the immoral purposes designated in the Act.s
In an automobile trip from a point near O'Neill, Nebraska to Moran,
Vyoming, the evidence showed that upon reaching the state line, the
women got out and walked across, then the defendant picked them up
again on the other side and continued the journey to its immoral conclusion. Because of the emphasis placed on the crossing of a state line,
as requisite for interstate commerce, it might have been believed that a way
had been found to evade the restrictions imposed by the statute. The
court frowned on this view and took the position that the transportation
in its entirety would determine if there had been a violation.9 It is well
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Act of June 25, 1910, c. 395, § 2, 36 Stat. 825, as amended c. 139, § 47, 63 Stat. 96, 18
U.S.C. § 2421 (1952 ed). Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign
commerce, or in the District of Columbia or in any Territory or Possession of the
United States, any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or
for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent and purpose to induce, entice,
or compel such woman or girl to become a prostitute or to give herself up to
debauchery or to engage in any other immoral practice; or
Whoever knowingly procures or obtains any ticket or tickets, or any form of
transportation or evidence of the right thereto, to be used by any woman or girl in
interstate or foreign commerce, or in the District of Columbia or a Territory or
Possession of the United States, in going to any place for the purpose of prostitution
or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, or with the intent or purpose
on the part of such person to induce, entice, or compel her to give herself up to
the practice of prostitution, or to give herself up to debauchery, or any other immoral pracice, whereby any such woman or girl shall be transported in interstate
or foreign commerce, or in the District of Columbia or any Territory or Possession
of the United StatesShall be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.
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established that when the inducer supplies the female with means or the
money to purchase a train or bus ticket, or purchases the ticket and mails
it to her, he has brought himself under the Act.10 It is interesting to note
that where the defendant furnished the money for the transportation of
the woman, in violation of the Act, it was immaterial whether the victim
used the identical money or not. 1'
Debauchery is defined as excessive indulgence in sensual pleasures,
sexual immorality or excesses, or the unlawful indulgence of lust. 12

The

term is not limited to seduction but includes a purpose to influence a
3
woman in ways which will naturally lead her into acts of immorality.'
"Other immoral purposes" is an all-inclusive term adopted to include any
4
other immoral relation not covered in prostitution and debauchery.1
The relationship of the accused to the female involved has very little
effect upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant. A wife may be
unlawfully transported for immoral purposes by her husband in violation
of the Act." Where a common-law marriage was shown to have existed
between the defendant and a woman, it was immaterial in respect to the
liability of the accused. 16
Quite o-ten the situation arises where the accused has simultaneously
transported more than one female for immoral purposes. The question of
whether there are two separate offenses presents itself. In a very recent
decision from the United States Supreme Court, it has been held that
transportation of two women on the same trip and in the same vehicle
17
in violation of the "Mann Act" constituted but a single offense.
The matter of intent is expressly provided for in the language of the
statute. Transportation for other than immoral purposes, and the commission of an immoral act with a woman while on an interstate trip,
where the act was merely incidental, does not bring the transportation
within the Act.' 8 However, the immoral intent or purpose need not be the
only purpose if it can be proven that such immoral purpose constitutes the
primary reason for the transportation.' 9 It has been held that the immoral
intention must exist before the conclusion of the journey and must be the
dominant motive of such interstate transportation.' : a This has been referred
to as the rule of "dominant motive" and was first applied in a case where
defendants operated a house of prostitution in Nebraska. Accompanying
them on a vacation trip to Utah via Yellowstone National Park were two
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women, inmates of the house. The defendants paid all the expenses of
the trip but no immoral acts were committed during the trip. After returning to Nebraska, the women resumed their immoral occupation. Mr.
Justice Murphy in delivering the majority opinion for the United States
Supreme Court stated: "To punish those who transport inmates of a house
of prostitution on an innocent vacation trip in no way related to the
practice of commercialized vice is consistent neither with the purpose nor
the language of the Act."'2 0 Consummation of purpose is not an essential
element of the crime. The offense has been completed when there has
been a transportation in interstate commerce with an intent denounced by
21
the Act.
The Maan Act does not attempt to cover illicit relationship standing
alone and is not punishable as such, for that is clearly within the police
powers of the states and most states have criminal statutes covering adultery, fornication and seduction.2 2 Under the Act it is the transportation
in interstate commerce that is condemned and the courts have uniformily
held it to be a valid exercise of the power of Congress to regulate commerce. 2 3 The Act is not an anti-seduction statute and is only incidentally
24
concerned with the chastity or unchastity of the woman being transported.
In order to constitute an offense under the White Slave Traffic Act,
it is necessary to show: (1) interstate transportation; (2) that it was for
an immoral purpose; (3) and that intent was formed or present before the
female reached the state to which the defendant intended to transport her.
The courts have been very liberal in construing the language of the
statute to cover a variety of situations concerning immorality. The existence of the Act since 1910 and the numerous convictions following its
enactment, leads one to believe that it has had the dual effect of punishing
violators and serving as a means of reaching organized crime where other
methods have failed because of difficulty in obtaining evidence that would
support convictions.
JAMES M. Cox

THE RIGHTS OF A WRONGDOING PARTNER
Whether a partner who causes a wrongful dissolution of his firm, is
then entitled to any benefits of the firm from the time of dissolution until
there is a final accounting and winding up, is a problem not specifically
covered by the Uniform Partnership Act. However, this is a problem which
has recurred frequently before and after the Act.
The Act provides in section 38 (2b) that those partners who have not
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